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Summary 
 
Purpose – To examine the existence and strength of the relationship between international tax 
competition and tax treatment of R&D in spatial analysis. 
Research method – The research hypothesis implies that the increase in the strength of business ties 
between economies takes place simultaneously with the disappearance of the differences in the tax 
treatment of R&D activities. As a measure of spatial differentiation, the trade cooperation indicator was 
adopted. Meanwhile, as a measure of the disproportions in the tax treatment of R&D, it was assumed 
that a difference exists in the amount of the B index. The occurrence of the relationship was verified 
based on the construction of the panel regression models for four scenarios, depending on the size and 
profitability of enterprises being the potential beneficiaries of tax incentives: large profitable and large 
unprofitable enterprises as well as profitable and unprofitable SMEs. 
Results – The analysis conducted enabled the Author to find the negative relationship between the 
variables in three out of the four scenarios. Therefore, the research hypothesis was rejected. 
Originality /value – An approach to spatial analysis was employed where the indicator of business 
ties rather than a geographical indicator was adopted as the key measure of spatial differentiation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The research and development sector and the resource of technological know-
ledge in the endogenic theory of economic growth are listed among the most 
essential determinants of stable growth and development in a longtime perspective2. 
Appropriate technological facilities not only constitute the basis for creating 
innovations in the economy, but they also accelerate the diffusion of innovations 
from other countries. According to Griffith et al. [2004, pp. 883-884] in those eco-
nomies that are not leaders in technological terms, the R&D sector is also important 
owing to the provision of enterprises with so-called ‘tacit knowledge”, i.e. specialist 
information which constitutes the starting point for the rapid imitation of new solu-
tions from other countries. However, most economists agree that the key impor-
tance in the increase of the resources of technological knowledge (both in inno-
vative and imitational economies) is played by the expenditures that are made by 
enterprises on R&D activity. 
R&D activity is the process where the final product (technological knowledge) 
and expenditures (among others, on human capital in the form of knowledge of the 
workers employed for the project, financial capital) have mostly non-material 
character. Therefore, it may be easily relocated, especially by large transnational 
corporations, the activity of which is based chiefly on direct foreign investments 
[Santos-Paulino et. al, 2014, pp. 1693-1697]. Among the most important determi-
nants of the way that enterprises specify their R&D activity, analysts list various 
factors: fiscal incentives [Kafouros et al., 2018, pp. 1252-1253, Alstadsæter et al., 
2015, pp. 24-25], the competition on the product market [Belderbos et al., 2008, pp. 
770-777], large industrial centers [Malecki, 1980, pp. 15-20], qualified research 
personnel [Ekholm, Hakkala, 2007, p. 537] or large scientific centers [Belderbos et 
al., 2017, pp. 705-706; Abramovsky et al., 2007, pp. C136-C137]. 
Therefore, many countries attempt to attract enterprises investing in R&D 
through the introduction of tax incentives. From the beginning of the 21st century 
until 2015, the number of OECD countries who experienced their tax systems being 
enriched with at least one preference directly connected with R&D activity has 
almost doubled and amounts to more than three quarters of all the members of the 
organization [Zegarowicz, 2018a, pp. 363-365]. Tax incentives may adopt the form 
of instruments of either front-end or back-end types (chart 1). The incentives of 
a front-end type are related to expenditures on R&D activity. The accelerated amor-
tization of the assets used in R&D activity may be isolated, the reduction of social 
contributions for R&D employees and the most popular ones – the allowances 
connected with deducting the expenditures made on R&D from the tax base or tax. 
Meanwhile, the incentives of back-end type refer to the taxation of incomes from 
                                
2 See: [Arrow, 1962, pp. 155-160; Nelson, Phelps, 1966, p. 75; Romer, 1986, pp. 1034-1035; Lucas, 1988, 
pp. 39-41; Rebelo, 1991, pp. 519-520; Grossman, Helpman, 1991, pp. 60-61; Aghion, Howitt, 1992, 
p. 349; Segerstrom, 1998, pp. 1305-1307; Guellec, van Pottelsberge de la Potterie, 2001, pp. 14-15; 
Sener, 2008, p. 3914; Ang, Madsen, 2013, pp. 1537-1538; Minniti, Venturini, 2017, pp. 324-325]. 
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R&D activity. These occur mostly in the form of incentives such as the Patent Box 
(Innovation Box, IP Box) which imply the preferential treatment of incomes from 
the intellectual property by reducing the effective tax rate, the temporary tax holiday 
or the complete tax exemption. 
 
CHART 1 
The division of R&D tax incentives 
 
Source: own elaboration on the basis: [Zegarowicz, 2018b, p. 156]. 
 
Due to considerable mobility of the location where enterprises commence their 
R&D activity, tax preferences may be introduced not only in order to encourage 
their own enterprises to begin such activity or to attract foreign investment, but also 
for the fear of the outflow of investment in R&D activity to other countries. The 
simultaneous occurrence of all three factors may lead to international tax competi-
tion. According to numerous analysts, the occurrence of tax competition between 
countries may be noticeable particularly in the economic activity where mobile pro-
duction factors are used [Andersson, Forslid, 2003, pp. 279-303; Devereux et al., 
2008, pp. 1210-1219; Mongrain, Wilson, 2018, pp. 177-180]. Undoubtedly, R&D 
activity may be included in this group. Meanwhile, the advanced tax competition 
may lead to negative phenomena such as the erosion of the tax base and transfer 
pricing as well as the shift of profits. In the case of R&D tax incentives, the prefe-
rences of the Patent Box type are the instruments which are particularly prone to 
such phenomena [Evers et al., 2013, pp. 37-39; Karkinsky, Riedel, 2012, p. 185]. 
There is extensive research which focuses on the selection of the location for 
R&D activity by enterprises and on the efficiency of tax incentives in the stimulation 
of the expenditures on R&D by both domestic and foreign enterprises. However, 
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only a handful of scientists make an attempt to analyze the relationship between the 
countries implementing the preferential treatment of R&D activity for their tax 
systems. Therefore, the research aims at analyzing those factors that determine the 
introduction of incentives on R&D from a spatial aspect. For the realization of this 
aim, it was necessary to verify the research hypothesis which implied that the increa-
sing power of trade connections between economies takes place simultaneously with 
the disappearing differences in the tax treatment of R&D activity, i.e. the occurrence 
of tax incentives supporting the activity. The effect ought to be strongest in the case 
of the taxation of large transnational corporations. 
 
 
2. Research methods 
 
The research comprised 41 economies3 during the period 2000-20174. The reali-
zation of the adopted objective required at least two variables: the variable repre-
senting the treatment of R&D activity by the tax system in the analyzed countries 
and the variable representing the spatial relationship between the countries. 
As the variable representing the existence of tax incentives in the analyzed 
countries and the power of their preferential character the B index5 was adopted. 
The B index is the measure of the level of profit before tax that a representative 
enterprise must generate in order to achieve marginal profitability from the unit 
outlay on R&D taking into consideration the way R&D is treated by the tax system 
[OECD, 2013, pp. 1-2]. The coefficient shows how many monetary units a parti-
cular enterprise needs to generate in order to finance the investment in R&D in the 
amount of one monetary unit within a certain tax system. It may be shown using the 
following equation [OECD, 2013, p. 1]: 
 B index ≡  1 − A1 − τ 
where: 
A – the total current value of all tax preferences connected with R&D expenditures; 
τ – CIT tax rate. 
                                
3 The countries included in the research: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South 
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, USA, Brazil, China, Russia, 
RSA, Columbia, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania. The research comprised OECD countries (without 
Austria, Greece and Turkey, which were excluded owing to the incomplete data concerning foreign 
trade – Austria or B index – Greece, Turkey) in the years 2000-2017 and the countries for which OECD 
organizes the statistic analysis of the value of the B index. 
4 The time range of the research is dictated by the availability of information on the value of the B index. 
The value of the coefficient has been estimated for OECD countries since 2000. 
5 The research used data representing the value of B index coefficient in the analyzed countries in the 
years 2000-2017 from the OECD database [2019a, b]. 
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The value of the coefficient may be interpreted in three divisions. When the B index 
is equal to one, the rate of the tax subsidy amounts to zero – all the expenditures on 
R&D activity are treated as tax costs and there are no additional preferences. When 
the B index equals less than 1 – the system includes the preferential treatment of 
R&D activity, 1 basic unit of investment in R&D requires the generation of less 
than 1 basic unit of profit before tax. When the B-index amounts to more than 1 – 
the tax system treats R&D activity in a discriminating way e.g. owing to the exclu-
sion of some costs from R&D activity from the tax costs. The coefficient is 
frequently shown as ‘1 – B index’ in order to present only the rate of the tax sub-
sidy. The coefficient is calculated for representative enterprises in four scenarios 
depending on their size and profitability: large profitable and large unprofitable 
enterprises as well as profitable and unprofitable SMEs. 
In order to illustrate the divergences in the tax treatment of R&D activity, in 
each of the scenarios the coefficient of the difference between all the possible pairs 
of two countries in the analyzed set expressed was calculated using the following 
formula: 
 Diff 1 − B index LP/LN/SP/SNtij = �(1 − B indexti) − (1 − B indextj)�, 
 
where: Diff B indextij– the difference in the value of coefficient 1 – B index between i 
country and j country in year t in the scenario respectively: large profitable (LP) / 
large unprofitable (LN) / profitable SME (SP) / unprofitable SME (SN); 1 − B indexti(j) – the value of coefficient 1 – B index in i(j) country in year t. 
 
The selection of a variable representing the spatial differentiation of the analyzed 
countries was a much more complex task. The frequently used measures of spatial 
differentiation are variables including the length of borders between the countries or 
the distance between the capitals. However, as Montmartin and Herrera [2015, pp. 
1070-1071] indicate, in relation to R&D activity, the usage of these measures would 
be ineffective. The reason relates to the fact that the expenditures and effects in 
R&D activity have a non-material character and the activity is realized by large trans-
national corporations. Therefore, according to these authors, in this case a much 
better measure of spatial differentiation is the coefficient of trade cooperation. The 
coefficient illustrates the meaning of the bilateral trade between any two countries in 
the foreign trade of a certain country6. The relation may be presented using the 
following formula [Montmartin, Herrera, 2015, p. 1075]: 
 TCtij = 12 �exptijexpti + imptijimpti �, 
                                
6 Data concerning export and import of the analyzed countries in the years 2000-2017, which was 
useful for calculating the indicator of trade cooperation, was taken from OECD database [2019a]. 
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where: TCtij – the indicator of trade cooperation of in year t; exptij – export from country i and into country j in year t; imptij  – import from country i and into country j in year t; exp(imp)ti – the sum of export (import) of country i in year t. 
 
The increase of the indicator indicates a higher degree of cooperation between 
country i with country j. The basic statistics representing both variables are pre-
sented in Table 17. 
 
TABLE 1 
The basic statistics illustrating the analyzed variables 
Variable Obs Average Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Diff 1-B index LP 29520 0.1288 0.1100 0.1175 0.0000 0.5000 
Diff 1-B index LN 29520 0.1030 0.0800 0.09901 0.0000 0.4500 
Diff 1-B index SP 29520 0.1410 0.1200 0.1218 0.0000 0.5000 
Diff 1-B index SN 29520 0.1211 0.1000 0.1125 0.0000 0.4700 
TC  29520 0.01997 0.005161 0.04361 4.775e-7 0.7967 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
In order to measure the occurrence of the relationship between trade ties and the 
differences in the tax treatment of R&D activity models of panel regression in each 
of the scenarios were constructed. As the dependent variable there were adopted 
differences in the value of the 1 – B index, whereas the coefficient of trade 
connections was taken as the independent variable. Such logical arrangement results 
from the adopted objective of the research which aims at checking whether spatial 
differentiation has impact on the preferential treatment of R&D activity in the 
analyzed countries. The general form of the model may be presented using the 
following equation: 
 Diff 1 − B index LP/LN/SP/SNtij = βTCtij + ϑij + ԑtij, 
 
where: 
β1 – variable parameter; 
ϑij – individual effect; 
εtij  – pure random error. 
 
 
 
 
                                
7 For the calculations the following programs were used: GRETL and Microsoft Excel. 
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TABLE 2 
The panel diagnostic tests 
Model/Test F-test* Breusch-Pegan** Hausman*** p-value ef. ind. p-value ef. ind. p-value ef. ind. 
Diff 1-B index LP 0.0000 Fixed 0.0000 Random 0.0105 fixed 
Diff 1-B index LN 0.0000 Fixed 0.0000 Random 0.1126 random 
Diff 1-B index SP 0.0000 Fixed 0.0000 Random 0.0024 fixed 
Diff 1-B index SN 0.0000 Fixed 0.0000 Random 0.0001 fixed 
* H0 = the estimation of MNK, H1 = fixed effects; ** H0 = the estimation of MNK,  
H1 = random effects; *** H0 = random effects, H1 = fixed effects. 
The critical value in all the tests: p=0,05. 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
The panel diagnostic tests above demonstrate the existence of two types of indi-
vidual effects (table 2). In the case of both scenarios with an SME enterprise and 
a large profitable enterprise the occurrence of the intended effects was observed. 
Meanwhile, in case of a large unprofitable enterprise random effects were noticed. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
Starting from 2000, there has been an increase in the number of countries having 
tax systems enriched with R&D incentives, but also with regards to the average rate 
of incentives’ preferential character in the analyzed countries (chart 2). In 2000, the 
average value of the 1-B index in the analyzed countries amounted to 0.04, 0.03, 
0.03 and 0.02 respectively for profitable and unprofitable SMEs and for large 
profitable and unprofitable enterprises. In this year the largest tax return from the 
investment in R&D was recorded in Spain where the tax subsidy rate amounted to 
0.44 for the profitable enterprises irrespective of the size and 0.35 for the unprofi-
table ones (chart 3, attachment 1). At that time the indicator amounting to more 
than 0.1 was observed in 9 countries as regards profitable SMEs, while in 
6 countries in case of unprofitable SMEs and large profitable enterprises and only in 
three countries in case of large unprofitable enterprises. 
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CHART 2 
The average value of the 1 – B index in the analyzed countries  
in the years 2000-2017  
 
Source: own elaboration on the basis: [OECD, 2019b]. 
 
 
Over the subsequent 17 years, the average value of the coefficient demonstrated 
dynamic increases and in 2017 it amounted to 0.17, 0.13, 0.14 and 0.11 respectively 
(chart 2). The rate of tax subsidy in that year was the highest in France – it amoun-
ted to 0.35 for large unprofitable enterprises and 0.43 for other scenarios (chart 4, 
attachment 1). In 2017 a considerably larger group of countries offered tax return 
from the invested monetary unit in R&D activity at the level above 10%. There were 
26 countries as regards profitable SMEs, 17 countries as regards large unprofitable 
enterprises and 22 countries in the other scenarios. 
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CHART 3 
The value of B index coefficient in the analyzed countries in 2000 
 
 
CHART 4 
The value of coefficient B index in the analyzed countries in 2017 
 
 
The results of the estimation (table 3) of the panel data for 41 countries in the 
years 2000-2017 confirmed the existence of the relationship between the trade 
cooperation indicator in the values of 1 – B index in three out of four analyzed sce-
narios. Low values of determination coefficient and the relevance level of the inde-
pendent variable do not enable the confirmation of the analyzed relation in case of 
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large unprofitable enterprises. In all the other scenarios, as regards to the analyzed 
countries there is negative correlation between the degree of trade cooperation and 
the differences in the tax treatment of R&D activity, which is an expected result. 
In each of these scenarios simultaneously with the increase of trade cooperation 
indicator by one unit, the differences in the tax treatment of R&D activity disappear 
by more than one quarter of the unit. Although the values of parameters are similar 
in all three scenarios, one may observe a minimum difference between profitable 
enterprises and the unprofitable ones from the SME sector. In the case of an 
unprofitable enterprise, the estimated parameter is lower by approx. 0.01 unit and 
amounts to 0.253375. 
TABLE 3 
The results of the panel regression estimation 
 Model 
Variable 
Large 
profitable 
Large 
unprofitable 
Profitable 
SMEs  
Unprofitable 
SMEs  
const. 0.134079*** 0.104259*** 0.146284*** 0.126174*** 
TC -0.263410*** -0.061683* -0.264688*** -0.253375*** 
     
LSDV (Between) R2 0.478262 (0.004518) 0.497399 0.554308 
Within R2 0.000570 0.005289 0.000556 0.000674 
*, **, *** means the changeability of the variable at the level of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 
respectively. 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
 
Interesting results can also be seen when undertaking analysis of the differences 
between the determination coefficient (LSDV) and the coefficient within the group. 
A decisively higher value of LSDV R2 in all the three scenarios implies that the 
model explains the dependent variable while taking into consideration mainly the 
individual effects. Hence the dependence is based on the differences between 
particular countries in cross section. The value within R2 close to zero implies that 
the impact of changes of the independent variable in time is insignificant. This may 
be caused by the fact that the value of both variables in time is subject to relatively 
small fluctuations. The changes of the 1 – B index may be caused solely by the 
modifications of the tax law regulating the functioning of incentives on R&D in 
particular countries. In turn, these changes are not introduced each year, which 
results in the existence of relative stability of differences in terms of the occurrence 
of tax incentives on R&D activity and the degree of their preferential character in 
particular countries. The relative share in import and export in specific countries, 
which is characteristic for their trade partners, is subject to annual changes but these 
changes are relatively moderate. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
The analysis conducted enabled the confirmation of the negative correlation bet-
ween the degree of trade connections between the analyzed countries and the diffe-
rences in R&D activity in the tax system in three scenarios: profitable and unpro-
fitable SMEs and profitable large enterprises. The obtained results appear to be 
consistent with the previous research studies concerning fiscal policy in relation to 
the available support for R&D activity. Montmartin and Herrera [2015, p. 1077] 
observed the substitutability between the domestic and external incentives on R&D 
in shaping the national expenditures on R&D, which indirectly may be the sign of 
the occurrence of tax competition. In the case of incentives of Patent Box type, 
Evers et al. [2013, pp. 37-39] and Alstadsæter et al. [2015, pp. 24-25] have noticed 
that one of the main reasons of introducing incentives of this type may be the 
process of international tax competition, especially in the countries with a relatively 
small tax base. 
However, such dependence has not been observed in this research with regards 
to large unprofitable enterprises. The lack of dependence in one of the scenarios for 
large enterprises does not coincide with the author’s expectations. According to 
literature, transnational corporations are characterized by considerable capital mobi-
lity and in the effect ought to be the strongest in their case. Therefore, despite the 
confirmed existence of the reverse effect the results obtained do not enable comple-
te confirmation of the research hypothesis. Owing to this, in accordance with the 
falsification principle, it ought to be rejected. While using the methods adopted in 
the research one may not confirm the existing relationship between trade contacts 
and the tax treatment of R&D activity as certain facts. 
The results of the research also provide essential information on the introduction 
and shape of fiscal incentives in R&D activity. It has been observed that the depen-
dence is slightly stronger in the case of profitable enterprises. This may be caused by 
the fact that not all countries introducing incentives make it possible to either 
postpone or return the value of unused preferences. Therefore, despite the existence 
of tax incentives having similar construction and general attractiveness in the 
‘‘neighboring countries”, the difference in the way the unused preferences are 
treated may weaken their effect in case of unprofitable enterprises. 
Another essential issue appears to be the divergence between the impact of 
individual effects and the effects that time changes of dependent variable have on 
the dependent variable in the estimated model. The obtained results imply that the 
reverse between ‘trade/commercial neighborhood’ and the differences in the tax 
treatment of R&D activity is most visible in case of cross-section differences bet-
ween particular countries. The changes at the level of trade connections in time do 
not have considerable influence/largely affect the differences in the attractiveness of 
tax systems in relation to R&D activity. This may be attributed to the fact that the 
construction of incentives is rarely changed. Therefore, as regards to tax compe-
tition, the high degree of trade connections ought to be stable over long time 
perspective so that particular countries will create their own incentives while taking 
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into consideration the preferences existing in the neighboring country. The impact 
of single fluctuations of these connections in time should be irrelevant. 
Additionally, one ought to keep in mind several limitations in the interpretation 
of the obtained results which result from the applied methods. Firstly, the B index 
does not take into consideration the tax incentives of the back-end type. Especially 
as regards such type of instruments (Patent Box in particular) one may observe the 
intensification of tax competition. Therefore, the Author will devote further research 
on the more detailed analysis of this particular instrument. The determination 
coefficient oscillating at 0.5 also implies that there are other essential factors which 
may give rise to the differences in the tax treatment of R&D activity. The impact of 
trade ties is only one of numerous determinants. Undoubtedly, there is the necessity 
for further research in this respect which may identify them. 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
The value of B index coefficient in the analyzed countries in the years  
2000 and 2017 illustrated in graphs number 2 and 3 
The 
country 
ISO 
code 
Large SME 
Profitable Unprofitable  Profitable Unprofitable 
2000 2017 2000 2017 2000 2017 2000 2017 
AUS 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.1 0.19 0.07 0.19 
BEL -0.01 0.16 -0.01 0.14 -0.01 0.16 -0.01 0.14 
BGR -0.02 0 -0.01 0 -0.02 0 -0.01 0 
BRA -0.01 0.27 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.27 -0.01 -0.01 
CAN 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.1 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.31 
CHE -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
CHL 0 0.34 0 0.27 0 0.34 0 0.27 
CHN -0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.23 -0.01 0.18 
COL 0.11 0.34 -0.02 0.25 0.11 0.34 -0.02 0.25 
CYP -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0 
CZE -0.02 0.21 -0.01 0.15 -0.02 0.21 -0.01 0.15 
DEU -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
DNK -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
ESP 0.44 0.33 0.35 0.26 0.44 0.33 0.35 0.26 
EST 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FIN -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.1 0 
FRA 0.08 0.43 0.08 0.35 0.08 0.43 0.08 0.43 
GBR 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.11 0.27 0.11 0.27 
HUN 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.2 
IRL 0 0.29 0 0.23 0 0.29 0 0.23 
ISL -0.02 0.24 -0.02 0.24 -0.02 0.24 -0.02 0.24 
ISR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ITA -0.04 0.09 -0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.03 0.09 
JPN 0.01 0.17 -0.02 -0.01 0.12 0.2 -0.01 -0.01 
KOR 0.13 0.03 0.1 0.02 0.17 0.26 0.13 0.21 
LTU -0.01 0.31 -0.01 0.25 -0.01 0.31 -0.01 0.25 
LUX -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
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The 
country 
ISO 
code 
Large SME 
Profitable Unprofitable  Profitable Unprofitable 
2000 2017 2000 2017 2000 2017 2000 2017 
LVA -0.01 0.31 -0.01 0.25 -0.01 0.31 -0.01 0.25 
MEX 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.07 003 0.05 
NLD 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.22 0.31 0.21 0.3 
NOR -0.02 0.21 -0.01 .21 -0.02 0.23 -0.01 0.24 
NZL -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
POL 0 0.1 0 0.08 0 0.11 0 0.09 
PRT 0.13 0.39 0.1 0.31 0.11 0.39 0.09 0.31 
ROU -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.07 
RUS -0.03 0.11 -0.02 0 -0.03 0.11 -0.02 0 
SVK -0.01 0.1 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.1 -0.01 0.08 
SVN -0.01 0.21 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.21 -0.01 0.17 
SWE -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.05 
USA 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.04 
ZAF -0.01 0.16 -0.01 0.13 -0.01 0.16 -0.01 0.13 
Source: own elaboration on the basis: [OECD, 2019b]. 
 
 
 
